Trump's Saudi Nuclear Deal Faces Congressional Review Amid Proliferation Concerns

President Donald Trump has formally submitted a proposed civil nuclear energy agreement with Saudi Arabia to Congress, initiating a mandated review period for the pact that would grant the kingdom access to U.S. nuclear technology.

A U.S. official confirmed the submission, stating that the agreement, overseen by the Department of Energy, complies with the Atomic Energy Act. The administration reiterated that the accord will only proceed if Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords.

The deal, finalized in July, would permit U.S. companies to export civilian nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia. The 30-year accord also includes provisions for the kingdom to construct AP1000 reactors, a project estimated to be worth tens of billions of dollars and beneficial to Westinghouse, which is jointly owned by Cameco and Brookfield Asset Management.

Congress now has 90 days of continuous session to review the agreement. If no objections are raised, the pact will come into effect. This review process is standard for U.S. cooperation with foreign nations on civilian nuclear power development under the Atomic Energy Act.

President Trump has previously stated that the agreement's terms would prohibit Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium. He emphasized on social media that "There will be no enrichment of material!" and reiterated that the accord is contingent on Saudi Arabia's participation in the Abraham Accords.

Proliferation Worries Surface

However, the agreement has drawn criticism from some Democratic lawmakers and nonproliferation experts. Concerns have been raised regarding the absence of a permanent ban on uranium enrichment or reprocessing, as well as the potential weakening of existing controls designed to prevent the diversion of nuclear technology for military purposes. Instead, the deal proposes a U.S.-built and operated enrichment facility, subject to a two-year feasibility study.

Matthew Kroenig, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, commented that while strengthening ties with Riyadh is understandable, it should not compromise established nuclear nonproliferation standards. Kroenig anticipates that the feasibility study will recommend that Saudi Arabia exclusively utilize imported fuel-cycle services, a common practice for countries with peaceful nuclear programs. He views this as a more favorable outcome than potentially enabling an additional country in a volatile region to develop weapons-making capabilities.

Erin Dumbacher, a Stanton nuclear security senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, noted that this agreement arrives at a time when the international nuclear order, historically led by the U.S., is already showing signs of strain. She highlighted that the deal deviates from the stringent nonproliferation measures the U.S. has historically enforced for nuclear energy exports.

Dumbacher cautioned that this approach could create a "slippery slope" toward more countries acquiring nuclear materials without adequate safeguards, potentially increasing the risk of accidents, security threats, and further proliferation. She pointed out that the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons has remained at nine due to these stringent measures.

Saudi Arabia has previously indicated that normalization of relations with Israel is contingent upon the recognition of an independent Palestinian state, a stance that has solidified since the commencement of the Gaza war in 2023.

Furthermore, Saudi officials have stated that the kingdom would seek nuclear weapons capability if Iran were to develop its own.